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dc.contributor.authorSanyal, Amal
dc.contributor.authorGang, I.
dc.contributor.authorGoswami, O.
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-07T23:35:23Z
dc.date.issued1996-04
dc.identifier.issn1173-0854en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10182/977
dc.description.abstractIn a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax rate sets about complicated strategic decision moves by both tax payers as also tax administrators. It is shown that in some circumstances, this may bring about a Laffer like behaviour of overall tax revenue, ie a higher tax rate may result in a smaller net revenue for the government.en
dc.format.extent61-78en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherLincoln University. Commerce Division.
dc.relationThe original publication is available from - Lincoln University. Commerce Division.en
dc.subjectLaffer curveen
dc.subjectauditingen
dc.subjectbribe chainsen
dc.subjectmathematical modelsen
dc.subjecteconometric analysisen
dc.subjectfinancial reportingen
dc.subjecttax evasionen
dc.subjectEconomicsen
dc.titleCorruption, tax evasion and the Laffer curveen
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.subject.marsdenFields of Research::340000 Economics::340200 Applied Economics::340203 Finance economics
dc.subject.marsdenFields of Research::340000 Economics::340200 Applied Economics::340202 Environment and resource economics
dc.subject.marsdenFields of Research::340000 Economics::340400 Econometrics::340401 Economic models and forecasting
lu.contributor.unitLincoln University
lu.contributor.unitFaculty of Agribusiness and Commerce
lu.contributor.unitDepartment of Global Value Chains and Trade
dc.relation.isPartOfPublic Choiceen
pubs.issue1/2en
pubs.organisational-group/LU
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce
pubs.organisational-group/LU/Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce/GVCT
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
pubs.volume105en


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